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ABSTRAGl' 
The traditional definitional constraints of terrorism have resulted in 
t he failure to effectively categorize all political acts of violence in the 
maritime en vironment. This thesis offers the more practical and useful 
paradigm of "Microviolence" for viewing this phenomenon. The intent of 
developin g this paradigm was to create a framework which permits the 
creation of a data-based investigation of all recorded incidents of 
illegitimate political violence in the maritime environment. The database 
itself is focused on the period from \975 to 1995 and was designed t o 
permit rigorous statistical analysis. The database includes 374 reported 
cases of microviolence and each were dissected into 98 separate variables 
to permit a comprehensive quantitative and statistical picture of the trend s 
and characteristics of microviolence for the past 20 years to he developed. 
The ultimate goal has been to create a comprehensive tool to determine and 
analyze the characteristics of illegitimate political violent incidents and its 
perpetrators. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis presents a data-based assessment of all recorded 
illegitimate acts of political violence in the maritime environment 
from 1975-1995. The assessment was carri.ed out using the 
Microviolence at Sea (MAS) Database. The study begins by ex:amining 
the sources of violence within the maritime environment and 
subsequently breaking out those sources with a motivation rooted in 
politics. Those sources of political violence were then applied to 
the paradigm created by Denis Davydov in 1812 and modified by 
Nathan l..ietes in 1979. This paradigm views political violence in 
three distinct categories; big wars, small wars. and microviolence. 
These categories are based on both the magni tude of the conflict 
and the legitimacy of the participant. Big wars and small wars are 
the domain of interstate actors and are used as methods to resolve 
their political conflicts. Those who can not enter this arena due 
to legitimacy or relative weakness frequently use microviolencc in 
order to affect change in the political systcm which ·often 
relegates them to the use of terror tactics. It is these incident-
oriented acts of microviolence that the MAS was designed to help 
catalog. All incidents within the database are unclassified. 
providing the widest access to the information. 
The MAS Database itself is structurally complex; consisting of 
374 recorded instances that have been dissected into 98 separate 
variables in an effort to conduct analytical and quantitative 
analysis of the microviolent phenomenon the maritime 
env i ronmen t . The scope of the anal ys i s has been to look at bo tb 
the internat ional and regiona l trends of this phenomenon over t h e 
past two decades; with internationa l trends receiving pr imary 
attention. Assessment variables for the international leve l of 
analysis were chose to allow the reader to view the results from 
the operational perspective of the mariner. 
It was the d e s ire of the author to use previous trends in an 
effort to predi c t the future of microviolence in the marit ime 
environment; this was done by coming to grips with the reality that 
violent confli c t is a natural occurrence and wi II take place as 
long as normal political intercourse between politi c al bod ies 
It is not the goal of this t hesis to delve in t o the age -
old controversy on the na t ure of man, but rather it i s an 
investigation of political violence which indicates there i s 
statistical support for the concept of natura l confli c t. This 
constant associated with microviolence is referred to as the noise 
of microviolence and can be statis t ically represented allowing for 
predictive aspect re s ulting from this thesis. 
Understanding the scope of mar it ime mi croviolence is a 
prerequisite for being able to as s ess its i mpact on international 
maritime trade and the international political s ystem. The resul t s 
presented in this study represent a first level assessment of the 
data over the last two decades. There is a weal th of addi t lona l 
information ava i l able in the MAS Database. I t s analytica l value 
will grow a s the d a tabase i s gradually extended over time. 

I. I NTRODUCTT ON 
While political acts of violence against the airline ind u stry 
have received considerable attention and scrutiny over the previous 
t wo d ecades , simila.T: i ncidents of violence in the mar itime 
env ironmen t have remained relative l y i gnored. As the shipp i n g 
industry carries out internatiunal commerce on the high ::;cas, t hey 
have be e n v ic timized by po li t ically motivated acts of v io lence that 
have r esu lted in brutal kil l ings, billions of dollars in destroyed 
or damag e d vessels, lost revenue and cargo, and mounting insurance 
c l a ims, The c asua l tie s in such acts are comparable to those in 
ac ts of pol iti cal violence aga i nst commercial jet I iners. Th e 
i solated n a ture of the shipping industry. however, has mainta ined 
a c l oud of secrecy around po l itically motivated vio l ence at sea. 
There have been several attempts by organizations such as the 
RAND Corporation and the Office of Naval Intelligence {ONI) to 
catalog acts of illeg itimate political vio l ence at sea in database 
form. Each of these efforts. however, has failed to effective l y 
c a ta l og all incidents that have occurred in the maritime 
environment.! Previous efforts have been l imited to only acts of 
violence tha t fall within the category of terrorism in the 
strictest sense. While these chronologies are important i n 
understand i ng politically motivated violence, they only touch t he 
! See. for examp l e, Brian Jenkins et a1, A Chronology of 
Ter r orist A t t ack s amI Other Criminal Actions Aga ins t Maritime 
Ta rget s , RA ND Corporation, September 1983. 
surface of what is occurring on the high seas. Morc liberal 
parameters will be introduced better categorize and 
statistically organize politicaJ violence the maritime 
environment. 
The heart of this thesis is the creat ion of the Microviolence 
at Sea (MAS) Database that chronicles all known acts of 
illegitimate and incident~oriented, politically motivated violence 
in the maritime environment between 1975~1995. Understandably, 
many of the incidents that are cataloged in this database can be 
found in other chronologies. This is the only available effort, 
however, that attempts to increase our understanding and view 
trends in maritime violence through quantitative analysis. 1 
Records of violence against the maritime entities were obtained 
from a myriad of sources from u.s. intelligence agencies to the 
shipping industry. Information in the reports themselves increased 
over the years, making avai lable the greatest data in the latter 
years of the period being examined. This is primari ly due to 
increased requirements placed on the shipping industry by insurance 
carriers as well as a higher reI iance on industry organizations 
such as the Maritime Security Council (MSC) and the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and their subsequent 
policies.] Unde,.~reporting that has been attributed to acts of 
Ibid. p. 6 outlines the inability to conduct quantitative 
analysis due to an insufficient database. 
j This is according to Mr. Thomas Fitzhugh, Chairman of the 
Maritime Security CounciJ. 
piracy at sea does not appear to be pr e sent in politi cally 
mo t i v a t e d v iol en c e.' There does not seem to be the stigma at tached 
t o repor t ing that reflects unfavorab l y on crew discipline and 
watchkeep ing , nor is there a concern of causing a diploma tic 
offen s e to the country where they must trade regular l y be c au s e o f 
the ve ry na t u re of politics being the motivation for the at tack. 
This has greatly aided the author's efforts in the dat abas e 
cr e a tion. 
This thesis will proceed in four sections. First, it will 
attempt to ef f ectively define the phenomenon of politicall y 
mot iva ted violence against maritime assets. This is necessary 
be c ause i t i s central to understanding the cr i ter i a for i ncident 
inclusi on into the MAS Datahase. A shift in the traditional 
paradigm of viewin g violence will be examined as it applies t o the 
maritime environment. 
Second, the MAS Llatabase itse l f will he addressed. Structural 
characteristics and an overview of the methodolo gy is exp l a i ned , 
detai l ing the uniqueness of the database itself. Both design 
strengths and I im i tations wi 11 be brought into context they 
pertain to this analysis. 
Thirdly, th e finding l' will be presented. Th i s s ection will 
prr~ sent both an analytica l and 4uantitative breakdown of th is 
p r oblem by both sta t istical and graphic means. whi l e it is true 
, 1.:nder-repurting o f piracy is outlined in deta il hy LCDR 
Ma rk C . Farley, Internat i onal and Regional Trends in Mar i time 
Piracy 1 989- 1993 , Thesis Naval Postgraduate School, Department of 
Na tio n al Secur i ty Affai r s, Monterey , 1993 . 
that the meat of this thesis is the database itself , this section 
presents the fruit of the labor. 
The final section wi 11 provide conclusion~ and an overview of 
the major themes of the thesis. 
A. OVERVI EW 
Prior t o the creation of the MAS Database an initial dilemma 
r e qu ir e d resolution: what were the de f ining requirements that 
me r i t e d incident inclusion into the database? From the very 
b eg inning it was recognized tllat this was one of tlle most difficult 
aspe c t s of the database formulation. Current accepted defining 
parad i g ms of politica l violence, while useful in addressing 
specifi c categories within the realm of marit i me pol itical 
viol enc e , f ail to provide an all inc l usive categorization of 
incidents. For this reason , a new paradigm is in order. 
B . SOURCES OF MARITIME VIOLENCE 
Inc i d ents of maritime violence do not originate fro m a single 
source, n o r are they born of a single motivation. Maritime 
violence can take one of many forms; piracy, vio l ence perpetrated 
by substat e contenders, acts of state bell igcrency, general 
interstate war, and violent political statements by international 
o r g anizat ions. Each of these types, less piracy, have one thing in 
they are all attempt to create change in the poli t ical 
status quo in order to modify the po l itical system. 
1. Piracy 
As mentioned above , piracy differs great l y from the other 
for ms of maritime violence in that its motivation lacks a political 
component . It is purely for monetary gain. The International 
Maritime Bureau (1MB) defines piracy as: 
The act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit 
i~~~~e~~n~~i~~ ~~~ ;~~~s the capahi lity to use force in the 
Piracy is nothing more than a criminal act perpetrated to increase 
one's monetary situation and will not be addressed per se, This i s 
not to say, however, that politically motivated groups do not 
commit acts of theft or kidnap hostages for ransom in order to 
finance their political campaign. More attention will be given 
this phenomenon later in this thesis. 
2. Politically Motivated International Organizations 
International organizations with political agendal' wi l l at 
times resort to the use of violence in an effort to further their 
Traditionally, these groupl' -tend to focus on po l itical 
caul'es that transcend state boundaries. Environmental and animal 
rights groups frequently use violent methods to faci l itate policy 
changes in fishing practices, the transport of radioactive 
materials, or nuclear weapons testing. Violent protests by these 
organizations frequently occur onl y after peaceful means to achieve 
their goals have been exhausted. 
3. Substate Conflicts 
Vio l ent eonfl icts that arise between pol itieal entities within 
the boundaries of a sovereign state often take their vio l ence to 
the maritime environment. Manifesting themselves as civi l wars or 
wars of national liberation, these substate confl icts generally 
Special Report-Piracy, TCC International Mar i time Bu reau 
Publication. June, 1Y92, 2. 
occu r between the incumbent government and an insurgent party. In 
some i ns tan c es the insurgents have de facto control of a segment of 
the popu la t ion and territory , but in the vast majority of t he 
si tuat ions t his is not the case. Some may view civil wars and wa rs 
of na t ional liberation as separate entities, but for the purposes 
o f t hi s investigation they have been combined due to the lack of a 
clear demarcat ion between the two, It was crucial that t h e 
topology was clean to faci l itate consistent categorization of all 
Movement s such as the Basque Ellskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or 
the Polisario Liheration Front (PLF), both of which rou ti ne ly 
attack Spanish maritime assets in their efforts to create their own 
respective sovereign states, exemplify this type of confl ict, 
4, General Interstate Warfare 
Stat es involved in general warfare will frequent ly take to the 
seas to engage their enemy, Clauzewitz's famous summation , "war is 
a continuation of policy by other means"& rings true as states 
engage enemies in this readily accepted form of po l itical viol ence. 
Acceptance is due to the normative larger size of these c onflicts 
and because of the legitimacy that surrounds them within the 
in ternational system, General ly , similar capabilities between 
s ides are prescnt in this type of vio le nce, 
S. State Belligerency 
States may choose to use acts of violence to further their 
6 Carl Von Clausewi t z, On War, Translate by Michael Howard 
an d Pe ter Paret, Princeton Press, Pri nceton, New Jersey, 1976, p. 
87 . 
political goals o utside the scope of general interstate warfare. 
This may be done overtly or through the use o f clandestine agents. 
Unlawful acts of belligerency are those committed in the breach of 
the laws of war, either due to a violation of a provision of 
international law or because they are not attributable to a duly 
commissioned belligerent. State belligerency often occurs when 
states oppose a situation or activity that fa l ls outside the 
international political system and subsequently are unable to use 
tbeir trad itional political methods to alter its presence. T his 
can produce vi 0 lence aga i ns t a spec i f i c indus t ry, non-governmental 
organization, or subs tate actor. State bell igerency occurred 
regularly during the Iran and Iraq War in the 1980s when both sides 
routinely attacked neutral flagged shipping and por t facilities in 
order to reduce the flow of war supplies and economic revenues to 
their opponent. 
C. TERRORISM AND THE CURRENT PARADlGM 
While the sources for political violence in the maritime 
environment are varied, traditional outlooks have viewed political 
violence in a bipolar manner. Incidents were considered either an 
act of terrorism. or were categorized as legitimate violence 
between warring states. Frequen tly, however, incidents fell 
between the cracks of these two distinct categories and were 
considered at all due to the restrictive definitions of the two 
accepted categories. 
By definition interstate war must be a conflict of at least 
two leg itimat e states tha t arc duly recognized within the 
interna t iona l Substate international 
organizations may participate in such conflicts, uut only as 
anci l l a ry actors. There is l i tt l e f l exibi l ity in the defining 
pr i nci p les of interstate war and therefore will remain i ntact as a 
categ o r y for maritime political violence. 
It is the category of terrorism, on the other hand, that ll' 
h i gh ly pro b lematic. Due to the pejorative nature of thil' word, 
la r g e ly d u e to the news media , to heighten the drama surroundi n g 
any ac t of v i olence, definitiona l problems cont i nually ari se. 
Te rror i sm and its definitiona l limitations are not new and have 
been it seed of controversy for well over a decade. Rrian J e nkins 
recognized the problems in his 1980 study of terrorism: 
The term "terror i sm" has no precise or widcly-
accepted definition. The prob l em of definin g terrorism 
i s compounded by the fact that terrorism has recently 
become a fad word used promiscuously and often applied 
to a v a riety of acts of violence which arc not stri c t ly 
terror i s m uy definition. It is generally pejorat i ve. 
Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all 
violent acts by their politica l opponents, while anti -
government extremists frequently claim to be victims of 
government terror. What is cal l ed terrorism thus seems 
to depend one's point of view. Use of the term imp l ies 
a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully 
attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has 
indirectly perl'uaded others to adort its moral v i ewpoint. 
Terro r .i sm is what the bad guys do. 
to the very /ilippery nature and the bias that is associated 
with the word - terrori s m - it is probably best to reduce it down 
Brian Jenkins The Study of Terrorism: Defini t iona.l 
Problems , Corporation, Santa Monica, Californ ia, November, 
1980. 
to what it really is: a symbolic act of violence that is used to 
influence a political audience by instilling fear or anxiety. 
terrorist group is nothing more than a political body that uses 
terror as a tactic in its political struggle. If this concept is 
accepted, then it is reasonable to assert that di fferent types of 
political entities can use terror tactics. and can subsequently be 
labeled as terrorists. 
This. however, flies into the face of the u.s. government's 
view of terrorism and who uses it. The State Department. as well 
as other governmental agencies, use the extremely restrictive 
definition of Title 22 of the United States Code, section 2656f (d) 
which defines terrorjsm as: 
.premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated 
against non - combatants by subnational groups or clandestine 
state a g ents, normally intended to influence and audience. 
This definition misses the very nature of terrori sm in that it 
restricts the use of this tactic to specific sources. ilsing this 
definition, it becomes apparent that neither internatjonal 
organizations nor overt violent political activities of belligerent 
states, which have occurred regularly in the previous two decades, 
can be incorporated in any study of the use of terror tactics in 
incidents of maritime violence. Politically motivated acts of 
violence against law enforcement officials and military personnel 
are also excluded due to the inability to include acts against 
legitimate combatants. State representatives in positionfi such as 
these are often lucrative targets for those using politica l 
violence as a method to achieve their goals. These shortcomings 
10 
fa il to capture mu c h of the violence that occurs in the " rea l 
WOl" ld" a n d wou ld lead to erroneous con c lusions if not included in 
t he MAS Da tabase chronology. 
D . SH I FT ING TilE PARADIGM 
The widel y accepted paradigm for viewing illegiti mat e 
po lit i ca l violence at sea holds its foundation in the mainstream 
idea o f interstate conf1 ict and t h e view of terrorism that i s 
e x emp l if ied wi thin the State Departme nt's definition. As 
previously outlined, the exclusive use of this framework fai l s to 
include a multitude of incidents of po li tically motivated violence 
based on the defining l i mi tations both on the source and target of 
t he v iolen t ac tit se 1 f . For thi s reason, it is neces s ary to 
abandon t his framework for one that broadens our understanding of 
maritime pol i tical violence. 
For the purpose of this thesis, a simple way to understand 
paradi g ms is to see them as maps. I t is widely known that "the map 
is not the territory." A map is simply an explanation of c ertain 
aspects of the territory. S The map that we have been u s ing to 
explain pol i t ical violence in the maritime environment is wrong for 
the terr-; tory that we want to look at. Becau !'< c of the 
inflexibility of the d e finitional construc t of interstate confli c t , 
it has become necessary to shed t he trad itional restr i c tive 
S This particular manner to understandin g paradi g ms and t h ei r 
inf luence i s offered by Stephen Covey in Seven Habi ts of Hi g lJl y 
EFfe c t ive P~op J e , Simon and Schuster, Fireside Press, 19 9 0, p. 2 3, 
definitions within political violence and look at terrorism for 
what it really is: a political tactic used within the spectrum of 
violence. So therefore, we must find a new map that better matches 
the terrain of the high seas in regard to political violence. 
The paradigm that best incorporates the many sources of 
political violence in the maritime environment was initial ly 
offered by the practitioner and analyst of Russian unconventional 
warfare in 18 12 , Denis Davydov, who distinguished three levels of 
political violence: (big) wars, small war, and those "burning one 
or two granaries. ,,9 The third type of warfare was later refined 
to small violence, or microviolence by Nathan Leites. tO The 
paradigm that Davydov and Leites offer is not broken down by the 
perpetrator or victim of the violence, but rather by magn itude, 
intensity, and purpose for the violence itself. Terrorism falls 
into this paradigm solely as a tactic available to those political 
entities desiring to use it. 
Davydov and Leites' paradigm adequately incorporates each of 
the sources of maritime political violence within its framework. 
Fu ll scale warfare between s tates that takes its violence to the 
maritime environment corresponds directly with their "big war" 
category without interpolation. This by definition is the highest 
in magni tude and intensity in the spectrum of violence and is 
conducted in a series of campaigns by one sovereign state against 
9 w. Laqueur, Guerilla, Doston 1976, p.46. 
Ie Nathan Leites, "Unde rstand ing the Next Act' TERRORISM: An 
International Journal, volume 3, Numbers 1-2, 1979. 
12 
another. These campaigns are designed to break the back o f t h e 
opponent by instilling sufficient damage and casualties wit h t he 
e ventua l goa l of destroying the enemy's wil l to continue fight i n g . 
Conve n tional warfare also ho l ds the most legitimacy in t he 
i n t e rna t iona l arena. I nterstate po l itical v iolence has b een 
re c ognized since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as a legitimate 
manner in resolving disputes between states. One does not have to 
look ve r y far to find examples of "big wars" The Gulf War of 1991 
and Wor l d War IT exemplify this category of po l itical v i olence. 
The c a tegory of "small wars" offered by Davydov and Leites is 
by design smaller in scale than "big wars" They are lower in 
magnitude and i nten s i ty , yet also take place in the interstate 
Sovere ign states generally engage in "small wars " when 
e n t e r i ng i nto a larg er conflict is neither possible nor pract i c al 
due to eithe r political or materiel considerations. Limitat i ons in 
one form o r another prevent them from rai sing the ante and engaging 
i n a large r scale conf l ict. Despite the relative reduction in 
size, the campaign-orientation and leg i timacy within the 
international arena are still present as one side attempts to 
attrit e its opponent. While "sma ll wars" can take many forms, they 
often manifest themselves as border skirmi s hes, as exemplified by 
the violence between El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua in the 
Gu l f of Fonseca. 
The remaining sources of political maritime violence -
politi c al ly motivated inte r national o r ganizat i ons. substate 
c o nf lic t s, and inc idents of bell igerency - fall into the 
category of "microviolence" and are deemed illegit i mate by the 
international syst e m. Microviolence i s the smallest of the three 
in both size and scope. Leites states: 
What differentiates microvio l ence a mere quantity - is 
that with "small war" you may expect to i mpose substantial 
~~~~~~~~~ I ~~c!~en~~e:~e:\~::.sI1 over the long run. and with 
The perpetrators of microviolence are relativel y weak in the arena 
in which they are trying to exercise their political wi l l and 
subsequently resort to tact i cs that often incorporate the use of 
terror in order to facilitate change in th e political system. The 
relative weakness may be manifested in the form of a manpower and 
armament I imi tation by a substate contender that is seeking to 
se i ze and control it own soverei g n territory. or even a state that 
is attempting to affect its political will in the face of 
restrictive coercive dip l omacy wit h in the internationa l system. 
E _ M I CROV IOLENCE 
Although not mentioned specifically by either Davydov or 
Leites, legitimacy escapes microvio l ent actions within the 
international community because the perpetrators arc operating 
against ei the r terri toria l and international law. Thei r 
microviolence, whi l e rooted in pol i tics, is essentia l ly viewed as 
criminal by those around them. The relative weakness of those who 
rely on microviolence has forced them to operate uutside 
1l Ibid. p. 1. 
" tradi tional" channels. which are frequent l y il legal, in the 
p ur su it of thei r po l itical goa l s. This often takes the fo rm o f 
terror ta c tics. 
Unl i ke the categories of "big war" and "small war", 
microvio l e nce lacks a deliberate campaign-orientation. TIle 
relative weakness of the perpetrator has forced them into an 
"i n ci dent mentality" rather than that of a campaign. Each 
mi croviolent incident is a stand-alone act that draws its value 
from t he perception of the act itself. instead of the damage or 
casualt i es that the act infl ic ted on the victim. Wh i le it is tr ue 
that mi c r ov i o len t perpetrators may cummit numerous violent 
i nc ident s , each act does not require other acts to convey the 
politi ca l me ssage. Specific incidents are independent entities. 
Mi crovio l ence is not simp l y violence. It inc l udes incidents 
that arc designed to inf l uence a l arger audience, no t necessari ly 
just those whom the rnicroviolence is directed. When directed 
towa rd the state, the microvio l ence may be used to publicize a 
specifi c cause or to demonstrate the weakness of the government to 
put pressure on the government and its supporters. How the 
aud i ence reacts is as importan t as the act itself. For this reason 
it is imperative to di s tinguish the victims of the act from the 
target. Microv iolent a c tors are primarily interested in the 
audience, not the victims, of the violent acts they conduct. unl ike 
t he campaign- oriented strateg ies of "big wars" and "small wars" 
In an effort to understand political violence in t he mar i t ime 
environment s hort of interstate confl ict, the MAS Database has been 
created. The MAS Database was des igned to capture all known cases 
of microviolence in the maritime environment and dissect them in an 
attempt to increase our understanding of this incident-oriented 
phenomenon. Unfortunately, the emphasis of this investigation has 
been limited to the v i ctims of the microviolence and not the target 
audience due to the inabi l ity to measure audience reactions and 
perceptions in a quantitative and statistical manner. Despite this 
fact, significant insight on this phenomenon is obtainable from 
focusing on the victims themselves. Those subject to the wrath of 
microvio l ence must understand it in order to effectively reduce its 
coercive powers. 
Ill. THE MICROVlOLENCE AT SEA (NAS ) DATABASE 
A. CONCEPT/ SCOPE 
The MAS Database was designed exc lus ively for the purpose of 
ana l y zing microvio l ence in a quantitative manner. It presently 
operat e s at the unc l assified level. Its structure was des i gned 
with t he u ltimate goal of being incorporatcd into the interagency 
J oint Ma ri time Information Element (JMIE). ll Subsequentl y, many 
o f the da t abase's fields are set up to be easily translated into a 
J MIE-compatible format. The datahase is comprised of 374 incidents 
whi c h llave he en dissected into 98 fields that were formul ated to 
i dentify the essentia l components of incidents of microviolence in 
t he maritime environment. AppendiK A i s a reproduction of the data 
col l ection instrument which was used to record individual incid e nts 
prior to their entry into the MAS Database. The large number of 
fields are essentia l to cap t ure the pertinent information that is 
avai l able from the many sources which currently report microviolent 
incidents. There i s currently no standardizat ion in incident 
reporting format and frequently there is only scant in for matio n 
available, especially in the ear l y years of the period in question. 
The data containe d i n MAS have been compiled using a wide varie ty 
12 J MIE is a secret l evel on - l in e system capable of be ing 
ac c esse d by up to 100 remote workstations. Users can download 
qu e ry - c o ntrolled raw data for ana l ytic purposes. The list of 
maritime informat ion sources which provide data tq JMIE is 
exte ns ive . 
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of reporting !';ources on political violence at sea worldwide. ll 
After reviewing a sample of the type of microviolent data 
that werc available, the database concept was formulated and 
Appendix A was created. Despite the best efforts, revision 
occurred several times in order to better tailor it in order to 
maximize the quantitative analysis of the available data. Numerous 
experts at both the Naval Postgraduate School and the Office of 
Nava l Intelligence were consulted and contributed greatly to its 
creation. II For the purpose of the analysis, it is imperative to 
that the MAS Databa!';e contains known incidents of 
microviolence from 1975 to 1995 at the unclassified level. It is 
not a sample. 
The data collection instrument was created to capture 
pertinent information reported in a majority of incidents, This 
includes date, type of microviolence, type of microviolent maritime 
target, perpetrator of the microviolence , and general region where 
I l Sources were: Office of Naval Intel I igence (ONI) Data, 
Department of Energy (OOE) Data , Defense Mapping Agency 
Hydrographic/1'opograph ic Center NAVI NFONET Ant i -Sh i pp i n g 
Messa ges, International Maritime Bureau (1MB) reports and 
publications, International Maritime Organization (IMO) quarterly 
reports, Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports, Lloyd's List , Selected 
open press reporting, A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other 
Actions Against Maritime Targets by Brian Jenkins of the RAND 
Corporation, Violence at Sea edited by Brigadier Brian Parritl, 
and the private chrono l ogies of incidents at sea by Samuel P. 
Menefee and Charles Dragonette respectively entitled An Analysis 
of incidents of Post-War Terrorism, Piracy, Sabotage, and other 
forms of Violence relating to Ports, Harbors and Roadsteads and 
1945- Pl'cscnt: A Chronology of Mari time Terrori sm. 
I( The structure of the database itself wa!'; l<!-rge i y based on 
the one used by LCDR Farley in his analysis on piracy. 
th e inc i de n t took place. Other fields were designed to refl ec t 
bi t s a nd pieces of information that were not found in all r eports 
in an effo rt to gain a hroad picture within the population of 
speci f i c inci dents. Once the myriad of sources were inspected and 
t h e information was entered onto the data collection instruments. 
th e information was arranged in u computer database to allow easy 
access and convenient data entry. Nevertheless. the nature of the 
sources of raw da ta was such t hal cod i ng dec i s ions were cons tan t I y 
required to allow for a co nsis tent codi ng process. When the 
database i s incorporated onto the JMIE host, i ts availability will 
increase d ramati cally. While it is true that more data is 
availabl e o n incidents of mi croviolence at higher levels of 
classification. the decision to ke ep the MAS unclassified was made 
to allow maximum accessibility. It is envisioned that one of the 
primar y us ers of this database and its findings will be the 
shipping industry as 11 tool to aid in reducing their vulnerabi lity 
to microviolence. Although much of the informatioo contained in 
the MAS Database is current ly avai lab l e to the user elsewhere in a 
raw or processed form. MAS has consolidated it i nto a single user-
friend lyl oca t ion. 1; 
Becausc of the vast number of information fields, the possible 
<;:omhinations of single or multi-variable analysis which can 
cogently be queried using MAS are hu ge . However, many f ields do 
II Microsoft Excel version 5.0 for Wiodows was used due to 
its ease and flexibi lity. Initial efforts were made to create 
the dat a base i n Superbase version 2 . 0 but proved excessively 
c u mber some and I i mit ing and were subsequently abandoned. 
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not presently contain sufficient data to allow those queries to be 
conducted. For this analysis , the author made the decisions on 
which single and multi-variable combinations to use. Fields were 
generally selected which had the greatest number of responses. 
B. LlNlTATTONS 
While every attempt was made to ensure both accuracy and 
completeness of the MAS Database, it is important to note several 
points. The analysis of the data is only as good as the data 
itself. As previously mentioned, it was the goal to ensure maximum 
accessibility to the data and subsequent conclusions which mandated 
an unclassified study. This, however, is a double-edged sword. 
K.nown cases of microviolence were purposely not included into the 
MAS Database because they were classified at the confidential level 
or above by government agencies. Therefore, it is crucial to 
understand that this study is focused on unclassified incidents 
which may provide a slight deviation from the true nature of 
microviolence in the maritime environment. This, however, has been 
determined by the author to be minimal. 
MAS incorporates the most comprehensive and thoroughly cross-
referenced look at maritime microviolence available to date. In 
many instances however, an individual attack is still only 
addressed by a single data source. As anticipated, data from 
various sources on a specific incident were frequently different. 
In cases when the data was significantly different, it becamc 
necessary to make a dctermination about which information would be 
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entered into the database. In these cases. cross-referencing of 
in format ion was performed and the information with the highest 
c r e dib il it y was incorporated into the database. The cod in g 
procedure for this first iteration of MAS was done exclusively by 
th e a uthor. As more cases were examined. the experience deal i ng 
with th e data became more usefu l in the deconfliction process t hat 
was necessary. There was an exhaustive attempt to deconfl iet 
inc idents long after they were first recorded in MAS. 

IV. FINDINGS 
A. THE MICROVIOLENT NOISE 
Because this study is focused on the past 2ll years, it should 
not be mi s c onstrued that mi c roviolence is a recent phenomenon. It 
has been g;oing on as long as socia l and pol itica! interacti.on 
between peoples have occurred. Cases such as the United States ' 
efforts to ha l t the Barbary Pirates in the ear l y 19th century and 
the German campaign against the ncutral commercial shipping during 
World War I exemplify this fact. It is only l ogical to assert that 
as the numbcr of societies and their respec tive po l iti c al agendas 
have increased, so have the occurrences of microviolencc. In othcr 
words , a certain number of microvio l ent incidents are guing to 
o ccu r due to the daily interaction of po l itical actors whether they 
be states , organizations, or g ruups. This is not a problem that 
can be made to go away without changing the very nature of politics 
or mankind. Peop l e will always try to evoke their will on others 
through vi ol ence. 
This c ontinued occurrence over time can be referred to as the 
statisti c al noise of microviolence. Noise refers to the finite 
number of incidents that UCCU1' cve::ry year a s a result of the dni ly 
in teraction of political c.ntities. Taking a Hobbesian stancc, this 
concept asserts t ha t a cer t ain noise associated with microviolencc 
wi ll be present globally despite preemptive precautions due sole ly 
to regu l ar pol itica l intercourse, provided normal interact i on 
be tween pol it ical actors occurs. It is the acceptance of the idea 
of noise that brings a predictive aspect to thi!i thesis. One can 
estimate the future of microviolencc in the mari time environment 
ba!ied on the microviolent noise that has been present in previous 
Simultaneously. the noise sets the baseline for determining 
deviation in incident characteristics within a given period of 
time. For this investigation the unit of time being use is the 
calendar year. It is not realistic to use zero as a baseline for 
measurement because no year in the investigation is void of 
activi ty. 
B. THE FREQUENCY OF MARITlME MICROVlOLENCE 
The trend in microviolent occurrences for the past two decades 
at first glance looks indecipherable, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
In actuality, however, this could not be farther from the truth. 
While it is true that the 20 year period yielded an average of 18.7 
incidents of microviolence annually, the noise of microviolence 
remained at a relatively steady 8 incidents per year. 
calculated by conducting successive averages el iminating the 
highest value. 16 In other words, one could anticipate, in the 
absence of any spike in microviolent activity, at least 8 incidents 
In any gIven year. The high was realized in 1984 with 70 
incidents. while 1977 and 1992 both recorded the low of 5 
microviolent attacks each. This great variation is best explained 
by looking at the political ingredient of microviolence. 
16 This is the standard methodology used to obtain the 
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Like political a g endas, microviolence is episodal. Whether 
used as a means to effect political change or to mainta i n the 
status quo, once the political goal has been achieved, its utility 
is great ly diminished, It is no longer necessary to conduct acts 
of microviolence if the reason for its inception is removed from 
the political agenda of the perpetrator. For this reason, spikes 
above the noise level are present in the 20 year record of maritime 
microviolence. 
The first major increase occurred in 1980 as the Christian 
Phalangists and the Pol isario Liberation Front (PLF) increased 
their violent efforts to create homelands for themselves through 
wars of national liberation in Lebanon and Morocco, respectively. 
As these movements began to loose momentum in mid-1981 their 
maritime microviolent attacks subsided dramatically, becoming less 
frequent but much more deadly. The decrease in incidents in 1981 
indicates this reduction in activity especially on the part of PLF. 
Increased microviolent activity in 1982 started a five year 
surge in attacks in both Central America and the Middle East. The 
quest by the United States supported Contras in Nicaragua to 
overthrow the incumbent Sandanista government led to the mining of 
harbors and the sinking of Sandanista vessels, while the factional 
fighting in Lebanon escalated causing the frequency and number of 
microviolent attacks to i ncrease. The event that instigated the 
greatest number of microviolent attacks was the war between Iran 
and Iraq. While both Iran and Iraq sought to inflict dama~e and 
hardship on the enemy, they also targeted neutral shipping that 
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c onduc tcd econom i c trade with the oppas i t ion. Thi s has become 
k n own as t he Tanker Wars of 1984-1986 w i thin the shipping industry. 
This s tate he l l igerency led to the deaths of hundreds of sailors 
a nd the l os s of hillions dollars due to vessel damage and lost 
econom i c revenue during this period. Damage that Iran and Traq 
i n fli c t ed on each other is not represented in this investigation 
because i t falls outside the definition of microviolcnce. 
Rampan t microviolence in the Midd l e East continued with a 
decline in 19H5 that one again surged in 1986. This situation 
changed drastica l ly, however, with the commencement of OPERATIOK 
EARN EST WILL. The ref lagging of Kuwaiti tankers and the subsequent 
immense U.S./NATO presence, serving as commercial vessel security 
in the region , rapidly suppressed the microviolent activity of b ot h 
Iran and Iraq. The worldwide frequency of maritime microviolence 
was reduced from 63 incidents in 1986 to 8 in 1987, solely due 
the U.S./NATO intervention in the conflic t . 
The cessation of th e infliction of neutral casualties as a 
result of the Iran and Iraq War returned the microviolence to the 
leve l s that were present prior to the dramatic i ncrease of 1980. 
This trend continued through 1993. The norma t ive microviolcnt 
noise level retul"ned to its anticipated level. Nineteen ninety -
f ou r, however , saw the fir s t trend increase in almost a decade. 
The ongoing conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the government of 
S r i Lanka and the vio l ent seizure of vessels by diasporic refuge e s 
f r o m states in turmo i l have led to t his recent increase. 
27 
C. MICROVIOLENCE BY REGION 
All microviolent attacks in the MAS Database have been 
separated into one or another of 14 general regions in the desire 
to obtain a regional perspective on mic roviolence. This breakdown 
revealed that while it is true that maritime microviolence if; a 
worldwide phenomenon, it is not equally distributed among all 
regions. despite a mean noise leve l of 10 incidents per region over 
the 20 year period. Figure 2 illustrates the number of incidents 
by world region from 1975 to 1995 . See Appendix B for a complete 
breakdown of states within each geographic region. 
The Middle East possessed the highest number of incidents, 
dwarfing all others. Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place 
in this region. This is predominantly due to the Tanker Wars of 
1984-1986 . The other regions illustrated reflect the anticipated 
noise levels with a few notable exceptions. Those being South East 
Asia, Indonesia and U.S./Canada. 
An above average level of maritime violence was noted by LCDR 
Mark Farley in South East Asia and Indonesia in the form of 
piracy.l) It if> interesting to note this proclivity to violence 
in the marit i me environment lacks a substantive po l itical 
component, although 2 instances of political groups resorting to 
piracy to finance their efforts at political reform have been 
recorded. Only 8 incidents, which equates to just over 2 percent 
of all the maritime attacks, were recorded in South East Asja over 
the 20 year period. No incidents were recorded in Indonesia. 









The other region of interest was that of U.S./Canada. While 
most residents of the u.s. view political violence as something 
"tha t happens over there" and wou ld expect i nciden t s wi thin the 
U.S. to be below expected microviolent noise levels. this could not 
be farther from reality. It is also interesting to note that of 
the 16 incidents that occurred in this region, none of them took 
place in Canada. This indicates that the U.S. possesses slightly 
over 4 percent of all microviolence within its territorial waters. 
While ranking seventh by region, this places the U.S. as the fourth 
highest in the frequency of maritime microviolent attacks within 
its sovereign waters. 
D. MTCROVTOLENCE BY WATERS 
To further understand where microviolent acts have been 
occurring in the maritime environment, the database was con-5tructed 
to allow breakdown of attacks by whether they took place in 
territorial or international waters. Figure 3 represents this 
query. Because microviolence is po l itical violence conducted by 
one political actor against another, it is under~tandable that a 
strong association would be present with the sovereignty that is 
implicit to territorial waters. Expectedly, 82.7 percent of all 
ma ri time microviolence took place within sovereign waters. This 
correlation is present with only one major episodal deviation. 
Th e Tanker Wars of 1')8 4-1986 . while commencing with attacks 
against vessels conducting commerce in territorial waters, quickly 
escalated to the engagement of vessels in internationa l waters, 
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normally the Persian Gulf. This continued throughout the period. 
reaching a high of 30 attacks in 1986. of all of the microviolent 
attacks in international waters 88 percent were conducted in the 
Persian Gulf during this conflict. The microviolent transition to 
international waters was quickly reversed with the overwhelming 
U.S./NATO presence that appeared in the Persian Gulf in 1987. 
E. STATES WITH THE HIGHEST INCIDENTS OF MICROVIOLENCE 
Like world regions some states incur higher levels of 
microviolence than others. In an effort to understand the number 
of incidents wi thin specific states the MAS Database was queried to 
further reduce the general region and territorial water data fields 
for analysis. Figure 4 illustrates the number of microviolent 
attacks that occurred within the territorial waters of each 
respective state. Only those states with more than 5 attacks are 
listed. This is done to indicate "chronic" microviolence in a 
relative sense. Those "chronic" states that have had maritime 
microviolent attacks take place within their waters accounted for 
over 54 percent of all incidents recorded. 
Tran led all other states in regard to victimization with 61 
microviolent attacks, or 16 percent of the total, within its waters 
which were predominantly conducted by Iraqi war assets a.gainst 
neutral flagged shipping during their jnterstate conflict. 
distant second and third in numbers are Lebanon and Nicaragua with 
26 and 19 attacks, respectively. As previously mentioned the u.s. 




F. WARNING PRIOR TO MICROVIOLENT ATTACK.S 
Trends of warnings prior to attack conducted to 
investigate the possibility of prior warning providing 
opportunity for the vessels to implement preventative measures. 
The Database revealed that microviolent attacks generally occur 
with little or no warning. Figure 5 outlines the trend of warning 
prior to microviolent attack. Only 24 percent of all attacks 
occurred wi th any forewarning prior to the onset of violence. Of 
these, the majority that took place are attributed to Iraq during 
their conflict with Iran. Ninety-seven percent of instances of 
prior warning fall into this category when Iraq outlined its 
belligerent intentions to those who dared engage in maritime 
commerce with Iran via a formal communique. 
The absence of warning prior to the onset of violence 
complicates efforts of implementing proposed polices of increased 
vigilance within the shipping industry and port facilities in the 
event of impending violence. This places the burden on the 
shipping industry to he constantly prepared for microviolence at 
all times. Despite this fact. one can predict which region, 
states, and waters are more likely to support a microviolent 
incident by looking at data with MAS. The greatest threat 1 ies in 
areas with ongoing hostilities hetween political actors. Vessels 
that venture into such environments are likely targets and put 
their crews at risk. 
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G. MICROVIOLENCE BY VESSEL FLAG 
Although port f acilities are the occasional target of 
microviolents, over 95 percent of a)l maritime assets targeted have 
been vessels. Victim vessels come from v i rtually every state that 
ma i ntains a flagged fleet. Due to the large number of states with 
vessels that have been victimized, only those states whose flagged 
fleet that have suffered at least 5 i ncidents have been broken down 
in Figure 6. Appendix B is useful in decoding the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (OIA) two-letter designation indicating state 
f l ag, 
There is I i ttle surprise in the fact that those states that 
have the largest number of flagged vessels have been victimized the 
Liber i a, Cyprus, Greece, and Panama exemplify this fact as 
all have been attacked the most frequently and simultaneously 
mainta i n the four l argest flagged commercial fleets in the w(Jrld. 
Also contributory to the probabil ity of attack is the per i odicity 
that a vessel enters the higher threat regions such as the Middle 
East. The more frequently a vessel transits through a hosti Ie 
region, the more l ikely it i s to suffer microviolent attack. 
Efforts were made to understand microv i olent v i ctimization as 
a factor of a state's commercial fleet size. It was the goal to 
see if some states were being targeted more than others on a 
s i gnifjcant scale outside of a s i ngle ep i sodal conflict. Despite 
the use of several methods, it was determined that there was no 
specific corre l ation between attacks and the number of vessels each 
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normalize the phenomenon confirm that the more ships a state flags 
and their frequency to transi t in higher threat regions seem 
solely determine their probability of microviolent attack. 
H. DAMAGE CAUSED BY MARITIME MICROVIOLENCE 
Microviolent physical damage to maritime vessels shown in 
Figure 7 largely mirrors that of the frequency of attack 
discussed in Section B and illustrated in Figure 1. Whi Ie there 
are slight variations, predominant l y in the early years of the time 
line, it can be deduced that devastation caused by microviolent 
activity has not increased dramatically lhrough the years. Damage 
was determined when it was either mentioned specifically in the 
incident report or deduced due to the successful use of a damaging 
weapon system in the attack. A further reduction by the amount of 
the damage itself was impossible due to insufficient information in 
the majori ty of reports. 
The unavailability of information on the magnitude of damage 
and subsequent insurance c la ims from the shipping companies and 
insurance carriers made efforts to assess specific monetary cost 
due to microviolence impossible. In fact, educated 
approximation was also nowhere to be obtained. 18 This is 
predominantly due to the highly competitive nature of both shipping 
companies and the insurance carriers alike. They do not desire 
either their monetary assets or liabilities to enter public forum. 
18 Numerous efforts were made by telephone in person to 
obtain an estimate of damage or the cost of repair of maritime 












I. CASUALTIES DUE TO MICROVIOLENCE 
The human cost of microviolence, through deaths and injuries, 
i!> one of the largest issues within the shipping industry. The MAS 
Database was constructed in order to understand the magnitude of 
casualties due to thi!> phenomenon. Figure 8 graphically displays 
all recorded injuries and deaths that were documented during the 
period of investigation. 
The 20 year period yielded 786 casualties which can further be 
reduced to 351 deaths and 435 injuries that required medical 
attention. This averages to slightly over 2 casualties per 
microviolent incident. The noise of microviolent casualties has 
increased throughout the years of investigation. In the late 1970s 
one could expect approximately 10 casualties annually but this has 
increased through the years to 32 in the 1990s , indicating tha t 
microviolence is becoming more hazardous for those who venture into 
the mar i time env i ronmen t. One can expec t three times as many 
casualties each year now than just 15 years ago. In addition to 
physical casualties 1347 individuals have been taken as hostages 
during attack. H The disposition of these hostages remain!> 
uncertain in many cases. 
Several interest i ng ob!>ervat ions were apparent. The years 
which had more microviolent attacks did not necessarily have the 
highest casualty rates. From this it can be inferred that some 
H This figure includes the 750 passengers and 331 man crew 
of the AclJille Lauro that was hijacked by members of the 






















forms of microviolence have a higher human cost than others. The 
high leve I of inj ur i es presen tin 1982 and 1988 were due 
specifically to the machine-gunning of passenger ferries in the 
Philippines and Nicaragua by the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) and the Democrat ic Revolut ionary All iance (ARDE), 
respectively. It appears these vessels were targeted specifically 
to cause a high casualty rate. For example, during a two day 
period in December of 1982 two passenger ferries were targeted in 
a violent surge that ki lied 8 and injured 130 innocent civilians. 
The high casualty rates in 1994 can be credited to the actions 
of the Tami I Tigers in Sri Lanka. Thei r frequent and devastating 
attacks on the Sri Lankan Navy have proven especially vicious with 
no end in sight. Three incidents in 1994 accounted for over 50 
deaths and 30 injuries to Sri Lankan Navy personnel. 
J. MICROVIOLENCE SPONSORSHIP 
Microviolence in itself has been defined as political violence 
that is conducted by either groups engaged in a subs tate confl ict, 
international organizations, or state belligerency and, therefore, 
it seems appropriate to conduct a trend analysis on what extent 
each of these groups are using microviolence as tool in their 
political struggle. Figure 9 shows this breakdown graphically. The 
unknown category was ut i I ized when the perpetrator of the 
microviolence was either questionable or could not be determined. 
Table 1 summarizes the results covered in this subsection. 
























by states as they attempt to effect their will on others. 
Microviolence associated with state belligerency, while present 
regu I arI yin small numbers t hroughou t the time line, reached 
extraordinary precedence during the height of the Tanke r Wars of 
1984- 1986. As previously mentioned, the level of state 
helligerency quickly returned to the norm after the U.S./NATO 
presence was interjected into the region during OPERATION EARNEST 
WILL. One hundred and fifty-four attacks (41 percent) of all 
document attacks have been classified as acts of 
be II i gerency. Despite the high level of this type of 
mic roviolence, the noise of state belUgerency was relatively low 
at an expected 2 incidents per year. These attacks have resulted 
in 159 casualties (1 19 dead and 40 injured) and the damage or 
destruction of 89 vessels. 20 Although a large number of attacks 
by states have occurred, this equates to better than one casual ty 
in each microviolent attack conducted by a legitimate state. The 
only confirmed source of state belligerency where hostages were 
taken was the capture of the Mayaguez in 1975 that resulted in the 
abduction of 37 perSonnel. 
Microviolent attacks associated with substate conflicts were 
the second greatest source of microviolcnce. There were 123 
confinned attacks by these movements (20 percent of the total ) 
which have resulted in 611 casualties (20<) dead and 402 injured) 
2~ Several vessels were struck several times by the Iraqi s 
during the Tanker Wars. One ves sel in particular was struck on 
fou r separate occasions by missiles from Iraqi warplanes. 
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and tlle damage and destruction of 112 vessels. The noise level 
associated with suustatc conflicts equa l s 4 incidents per 
While not the greatest source of i ncidents over the period u nder 
investigation, suhstate conflict did account for the highest n oi se 
level, casualt i es, and number of hostages. These movements have 
been credited with the taking of 1297 hostages for politica l 
leverage. 
I nternationa l organizations, while nowhere as active as either 
states or subs tate contenders, have maintained a near l y constant 
leve l of microvio l ent noise with except i on of one surge which 
transp i red in 1981. This corresponds to noise level of 1 incident 
per year. International organizations have conducted 25 
microviolent attacks over the past two decades which averages to 
1 .2 5 attacks per year. Only 14 casualtiefl (3 dead and 11 injured) 
are attributed to microvio l ence by international organ i zat ions and 
25 vessels have been damaged or de s troyed. This indicates that 
when international organ i zations turn to microviolence the y have 
successful in inflicting damage in one f orm or another to their 
targets 100 percent of the time. Only 11 hostage abductions have 
been credited to these organ i zations. 
45 
I State International Subs tate 
I Be l J igerency Organizations Contenders 
Number of 154 25 123 I 
Incidents 
Incident Noise 2 I 
Total 159 14 611 I 
Casualties 
Deaths I 119 209 
Injuries 40 11 402 
Hostages 37 11 129 7 I 
Table J. Breakdown 0 Subsec t i on Resu l ts 
K. WEAPONS USED iN MICROVIOLENCE 
As subscr i bers to microvio l ence conduct thei r acts, they 
normally use weapons to either inflict direct damage or La coerce 
tileir victims. The MAS Database attempted to capture the type of 
weaponry employed i n these attacks. A spec i fic field was created 
that categorized 9 different weapon types used, from exploding 
devices by those perpetrator s wi til the technical wherewi thaI to 
the usc of swords by the more pr i mitive. In the event that a 
multitude of weapons types were used in a specific microviolent 
attack. the case was categorized by the most destructive weapon 
used. Figure 10 il l ustrates the use of the 4 most f r equently 
used weapons in microviolence and their use over the 20 year 
period of invcstigation. Table 2 summarizes the specifics 
outlined in this subsection. 
T he weapon of choice was the use of exploding devices in one 
fOI-m or another . Tllis cat e gory does not include mines, either 



















was the author's desire to view these as a separate entity. This 
category does. however, i nclude the use of radar gu i ded missi les 
by techn i cal l y proficient state belligerents. Both port 
faci l ities and vessels were the victims of attacks using 
explosives, hut the vast majority were vessels, One hundred and 
eighty-four attacks against vesse l s occurred, Explosive use 
resulted in 502 casualties. The l ar gest employers of explosives 
were state be l ligerents, who were also the most frequent 
perpetrators of microviolence, 
The second most frequently used weapon type was machine -
Thei r use was emp l oyed in 60 different attacks which 
resulted in 205 casualties. This equates to 3.4 casualties per 
attack making machine-gun use the most devastating weapon in the 
conduct of microviolence, Target selection is predominantly the 
reason for this . When passenger ferries were tar~eted. machine-
guns were the weapons of choi c e inflicting large numbers of 
casualties. 
The use of mines occurred re gularly totalling 27 incidents. 
The majority of these took place in Nicaragua and the Middle East 
which accounts for the sharp rise in their employment in )984 at 
the hei g ht of the conflicts in these regions, Only used in 7 
percent of the attacks. underwater mines were responsible for 6 
cas ualties and the damage of 27 vessel s making them 100 percent 
effec t ive in their ability to cause damag e. 
State actors have one weapon ~ystem not avai \ab l e to other 
perpetrator s of microviotence , that i s the abi lity to use their 
navy as an instrument of violence by using the organic weapon 
systems avai lable on their Craft. The use of weapons on naval 
vessels was categorized as naval gunfire and accounted for 15 
attacks a gainst both vessels and port faci l ities. Naval gunfire 
attacks resu l ted in 26 casualties. 
k rnbe, of 





15 I Incidents 
I Casual tics J 502 205 6 J 26 
Casualty/No. of I' 7 1 3 4 I , .58 I Incident 
Table 2. Breakdown of Subsection Resu l ts 
L. MARITIME MrCROVIOLENT GROUPS 
One of the most important fields in the MAS Database 
indicates the state, group, or organization that has been 
confirmed to have conducted the microviolcnt incident. 
Confirmation of the perpetrator in each case was cstabl ished by 
either eye witness accounts or a sing l e claim acknowledging 
responsibi lity by a group. on incidents that had multip le 
parties cl a iming responsibility and culpability could not 
reasonably be determined. the field was left blank in the event 
that final determination can be made at some point in the future. 
The following list of perpetrators of microviolcnce is far 
from conclusive and reflects only the 10 most frequent 
subscribers to this tactic. They are listed in order of their 
frequenc y of mic roviolent use as il lus trated in Figure 11. These 
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10 groups account for 51 percent of all microviolent attacks from 
1975-1995. 
1. The I raqi Government 
Iraq reI ied on the use of maritime microviolence in its war 
against Iran from 1981 through 1987 . They frequently engaged 
merchant shipping traffic that conducted commercial trade with 
its enemy Iran. The height of microviolent activity was reached 
in the sp ring of 1984 when Iraq began a series of attacks against 
tankers calling at Kharg Is land, Iran. The aim of these attacks 
was to hurt Iran's petroleum import capacity by scaring away 
prospective t rade by targeting neutral -s tate shipping through 
increased insurance rates, and actual damage inflicted to the 
vessels. 21 The majority of attacks were carried out by Super 
Extendard and later Mirage Fl fighter aircraft. They were 
equipped with Exocet anti - ship missiles, which can be launched 
to 35 - 40 miles away from the target, and guided to the target by 
radar. Ninety-one confirmed Iraqi microviolent attacks, or 24 
percent of all microviolent incidents, were conducted. 
2. The Iranian Govermnent 
Like Iraq, Iran also carried out "retaliatory" strikes against 
ships trading with its enemy, althoug h to lesser extent. Iran's 
confirmed microviolent efforts numbered 31 throughout i ts war 
with Iraq. Iran relied more on anti-shipping missiles from 
helicopters which proved l ess effective and required a closer 
21 Thomas S. Schiller, Viol ence at Sea, Edited by Brigadier 
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approach to the target. 
3. Pol isario Liberations Front (PLF) 
The Polisario Liberation Front. which is currently fighting 
for the independence of what was formerly the Spanish Sahara, has 
been one of the most active practitioners of maritime 
microviolence. In the MAS Database, PLF is credited with 19 
confirmed attacks since 1975. The usual modus operandi is to 
engage fishing vessels off of the coast of what Polisario claims 
is the Saharan Arah Democratic Republic. They often use 
inflatable-type motorized boats, and usually attack the target 
with machine-guns or rocket propelled grenades (RPG). On several 
occasions. the vessels have been boarded. the crew abducted and 
held for ransom. Two such incidents in 1980 were instrumental in 
obtaining Spanish and Portuguese recognition of Polisario. 
4. Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 
The ARDE which was based in Nicaragua and adjacent countries 
conducted 12 confirmed microviolent attacks against the 
Sandanista regime in the maritime environment. Their 
microviolent activities began in 1983. peaked in 1984, and all 
but ceased by the end of 1985, Most of the attacks recorded were 
the resul t of vessels striking mines placed by ARDE off 
Nicaraguan ports or the machine-gunning of passenger ferries. 
The mining incidents of in the maritime environment were 
merely a part of their larger effort to disrupt the Nicaraguan 
economy. The most controversial aspect of the ARDE microviolent 
actions was the role of the United States in the maritime 
attacks. The United States. the CIA in particular, was found 
culpable in aid in!=!; the ARDE mining actions by the International 
of Justice in the Hague. 
5. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
The Sea Shepherd Conservation Sociely is a non- governmental 
organization (NOO) involved in the investil!;ation and 
documentation of violations of international law, regulatjons and 
treaties protecting wild] ire species. The Society is also 
involved with the enforcement of international laws, regulations 
and treatjes when no enforcement by national governments or 
international regulatory organizations occurs due to ahsence or 
poliUcal will. In these instances, Sea Shepherd takes 
enforcement into their own hands through he use of microviolence 
against those they believe are not complying to the required 
guidel ines for marine wildlife. They have conducted 9 
microviolent acts during the period under investigation against 
their adversaries, generally in the form of the sinking of 
vessels through ramming or sabotage. They are considered a 
greater threat than other international organizations such as 
Greenpeace because of the i r proc 1 i vi ty toward premed i ta ted 
vi!,:ilante-type violence. 
6. Tami 1 Tigers 
The 11 year war of national J iberation waged by the Tamil 
Tigers against the government of Sri Lanka did not enter the 
maritime environment with any regularity until 1990. Since then, 
75 percent of their attacks have taken place. The Tamil Tigers 
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have conducted 8 attacks at sea during the 20 year period. 
suicide bombings and the ramming of government naval vessels with 
explosive- laden small craft are their tactics of choice. 
Incidents are rapidly increasing and it is likely that the 
microviolent attacks will continue until a resolution to the 
conflict within Sri Lanka is realized. 
7. Greenpeace 
The NGQ Greenpeace has used microviolence to further its 
environmental causes throughout the wor l d. Tts relatively larg e 
number of inventoried ve s sels have given this organization 
extreme flexjbiljty in making their political statement. Whi l e 
the majority of their demonstrations remain peaceful, they have 
been credited with 6 jncidents of microviolence. 
The s e incidents tend to occur due to inadvertent escalation 
of a planned peaceful protest. The microviolence was 
premed i tated, but rather resulted through the lack of control by 
both the protestors and those prote s ted against. It j s important 
to note that Gceenpeace has also been the victim of microviolent 
actions as exemplified by the sinking of the vessel Rainbow 
Warrior i n New Zealand by French agents which resulted j n one 
death. 
8. Israeli Government 
The Israeli government. most notahly the I sraeli Navy. have 
conducted several microviolent attacks against maritjme targets. 
Not perceiving their actions as state belligerency. the IsraeUs 
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view their microvi o lence as preemptive in nature. 1! In o r der to 
protect their citizenry they bel ieve they must take the conflict 
to the terr i tory o f their enemies even in the absence of open 
hostilities. Six mi croviolent incidents have been credited 
them. 
9. Irish Republ iean Army (IRA) 
The long standing conflict between the IRA and the Briti s h 
government over the control of Northern I rei and has a lon g 
history of maritime microviolence. This is under s tandable in 
li g ht of the fact that hoth I reland and the United Kingdom are 
island states and a r e closely 1 inked to the sea. I RA attacks in 
the maritime element have caused comparatively J i ttle damage and 
have ob t a ined little lasting publicity with the exception of the 
assassjnatjon of Lord Mountbatten by a bomb while on his yacht 
Shadow V in August of 1979. Their 5 incidents during the 20 year 
period of analysis have been minuscule when compared with their 
terrestrial effort s . 
10. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
This Filipino Moslem separatist g ruup is credited with 4 
microviolent attacks. While it is true the MNLF has not 
conducted 11 Jarge number of attacks . they are responsible for 
s ome of the most brutal and deadly attacks to date. They have 
hijacked ferry vessel wi th large numbers of passengers and 
g e n era l ly sought ransom in order to further f i nance their 
22 Samual M. Katz, Guard~ Without Frontiers, Arms and Annour 
P r ess . 1990. p. 54. 
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separatist movement. Frequently, they machine-gunned large 
percentages of the passengers in an effort to lend credibility to 
their continued threats of violence. The MNLF has not conducted 
an attack since 1983 and experts have suggested that they reached 
the peak of their activity in the mid 1970s; and have 
subsequently been coopted and divided, with a resulting decline 
in strength ever since. lJ 
M. TRENDS ot' HIGH MICROVIOLENT STATES 
The episodal nature of microviolence is readily visible when 
examining the 5 states wi th the highest level of microviolent 
victimization over the past two decades. See Figure 12 . One 
see that the violence is limited to periods where political 
conflict is present. As the political situation becomes less 
volatile due to either resolution of the political conflict, as 
in the case Nicaragua, or the appearance of a stabiliz i ng force 
such as the Western involvement in the Persian Gulf, then the 
incidents o f microviolence subside and eventually disappear. 
N. RECENT TRENDS OF HlGH MICROVIOLENT STATES 
The past 5 years have shown a marked difference in those 
states which have higher levels of microviolent victimization 
than those mentioned in the previous subsection. Only one state 
in the past 5 years can also be categori7.ed as one of the highest 
incident state's over the entire 20 year period. This indicated 


















that a transition in microviolent victimization has taken place 
ag "new" states become victims, while the "old" stales resolve 
their po l itical situations that have resorted to vio l ence in the 
quest for a f;olution. Figure 13 reveals those states with the 
highest microviolent victimization frequency from 1989 to 1994 in 
an effort to understand the current world microvio l ence 
situation. 
Both C.uba and Sri Lanka show a dramatic increaf;e in 
activity. Greece also shows an increase over the period but has 
seen a reduction in microviolent incident from 1993 to 1994. The 
events in Sri Lanka are the result of the Tamil push for 
independence and establishment of their own homeland. The Cuban 
problem, on the other hand, is truly unique. The microvio len t 
incidents that have occurred in the 5 past five years in Cuba 
have all been the result of refugees seizing vessels and crews 
with a desire of leaving the country for the United States where 
they are hoping to obtain asylum. On several instances the 
vessels were seized by groups of refugees estimated at 2000 
people. Similar incidents have taken p l ace with Algerians trying 
make there way to Italy, but to a lesser extent. Thif; violence 
associated with mass demographic movements in the hopes to evade 
political and economic crisis in their homeland is a recent 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A. THE MICROVIOLENT PROBLEM 
This thesis was initially undertaken as an effort to create a 
database to help in the understanding of terrorism within the 
maritime environment. It soon became apparent that by looking at 
only terrorism within the traditionally accepted guidelines, the 
database would ref l ect nothing more than a hand full of cases, 
whi I e other cases wi th similar characteristics would be left out. 
Hence, the search for a functional paradi gm that looked at the 
problem from a unique position: that of the individual operating in 
the maritime environment , whether that person be a mariner, 
soldier, or i n the employment of a port faci l ity. To these people 
it is quite transparent who is the perpetrator of the political 
violence. The only fact of importance is that it occurred and what 
can they do to prevent it from happening again. 
While it is not the goal of this thesis to make 
recommendations for actions to prevent incidents of microviolence, 
it is the goal to find out what is transpiring in the maritime 
env j ronment outside of restrictive and politically correct 
definitions. It i s believed that this goal was achieved by 
selectjng the correct paradigm for viewing the problem. The 
concept of microviolence allowed this comprehensive database and 
subsequent findings to be realized. 
S. CONCLUSIONS 
The constant presence and regularity of maritime microviolence 
throughout 1975-1995 and the subsequent results from "looking at 
the numbers" has resul ted in several themes that seem to occur 
regularly throughout the authors analysis and may be the foundation 
for further future study. They are as fo l lows: 
1. Microviolence will always he present as long as political 
groups interact. This creates the background noise for episodal 
deviations which may result i n incident increases in a given year 
due to specific conflicts; the noise of microviolence sets the 
baseline for e)ol:pectation. This equates to anticipated 8 incidents 
annually resulting in 32 casualties and the damage of 6 vessels. 
2. States that have strong ties to the maritime environment 
suffer more readily to maritime microviolence than those that do 
Whi Ie this may seen obvious to some. it is an important fact 
nonetheless. Not al l affected by maritime 
rnicroviolence. Those, however. that are affected must both 
anticipate incidents to occur and be prepared to handle such 
problems. Neutra l flagged vesse l s that enter territorial waters or 
regions where conflicts are present have also been attacked 
regularly indicating that maritime oriented states that enter 
foreign areas with ongoing political conflict also increase their 
chance of attack. 
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J. Like political agendas, microviolenee is episodal, It 
fluctuates with the political environment. As the situation calms 
so does the frequency of violence, Microviolenee will subside and 
eventually disappear during 11 conflict between political actors on 
its own. life is only as long as the political conflict 
present itse lf. 
4. Massive intervention similar to that which occurred during 
OPERATION EARNEST WILL seems to deter and suppress microv iolence in 
a region with "chronic" incidents. The massive U.S./NATO presence 
in the Middle East during the Tanker Wars virtually stopped 
microviolence in the region. This seems a viable option in the 
resolution to future conflicts where the international community 
cannot wait for the conflict to resolve itse lf. 
5. Microviolence is becoming more hazardous for the mariner 
due increased casualty rates. This may be a result of a numbing 
effect within the international arena as po l itical contenders 
compete to ensure their agenda reaches the public forum. The noise 
of casual ties as a result maritime microviolence has increased from 
10 casualties per year in the lale 1970s to 32 per year loday. 
The purpose of this thesis was to create a comprehensive database 
on illegitimate political violence. Thc resulting Microvio lence at 
Sea Database is the most complete reposi tory of thi s phenomenon in 
t h e mar j t irue env i Tonment . The t'indings contained i n this 
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assessment were deigned to give the reader a br i ef introduction to 
the way the MAS Database can contribute to the larger analytical 
examination of political conflict. 
MICROVIOLENCE AT SEA DATABASE 
I 1 I 1 I 1 I 
YYMMDD 
V ESS EL_NAME OR PORT FAC I LITY ATTACKED _ _ _____ _ 
TYPE_ TAR: 1. Ve ss el 2 . Port Facility 
OWNER: _ ___________ _ 
GP_RESP: _________ _ __________ _ _ 
SPONSOR: 1. 2. Internationa l Oreani z ation 
3. Local nat i onal 4. Unknown 
GROUP _ eTRY : 
MOTIVAT ION : ______ ________ _ _ ___ _ _ 
TY PE: 1. Incendiary or expl osive device used 
2. Mines or explosive devices placed on h ull 
3. Gun.i ire from approaching boat or aircraf t 
4. Jliidnapping or hosta g e taking on l y 
5. Other 
2. Night 
LATITUDE : I 1 I I J 
LONGITUDE : I I I I ! 
GEN -REGIO}/: See Codebook for this category. 
WATERS: 1. Inter n at ional 2 Territorial 
r:aunt ry 
PORT: Use JMIE Port List 
16 January 95 :Version 2 
rAIWET INFORMATION 
STATUS: 1. Underway 2. Pierside 3. At anchor 4. Under Tow 
5. Ori fting 6. Awaiting Berthing (In an anchorage) 
7. Disabled (Non-maneuverable) 8. Moored 
9. Port Facility Ttself 
VESSEl Actual Speed (Knots) 1_. __ I_T Code at 0 in 2, .1, 8, 
or 9 ahove. 
I See Code Book, also ONI-2GG{)S-OOl-93 (March 1993) 
HOMEPORT: 1 __ 1 Country (Not the same as Flag!) 
CREW SIZE: I 
CREW_NAT_OFF: I 1 __ 1 
CREW_NAT_C: 
PAST_ATT: (Previous History of Terrorist Attack): 
PAST RT: (Same routine): 1. Yes 2. No 
PERM_CODE: 1. Scuttled or abandoned 2. Recovered J. Destroyed 
4 Disposition Unknown 
USE_WATCH (DIo:CK) 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES USED 
USE WATCAN 
USE_WATCH (llridge) I 
L'SE_EVASMVT 
"' 
1 (Evasive mvmt) 
NUM_ TERRORISTS I I I 
BOARD_SUCCESS: 1 . Yes J. No Attempt 
APP _NAT : (Appearance, Na tiona Ii ty) 1 I I 
2. No 
APP_DISGUISED: 
TER_OBS: (Terrorist observed while onboard) 1. Yes 2. No 
METHOD_ BRDING: (Method of board ing) 
1. Anchor Chain 2 . Stowaway J. Other Vesel 4. Brow 
5. Grappling Hook 6 . Mooring Line 7 . Ladder 8 . Stern Ram;:> 
9 . Ship Itse l f 
PLACE_BOARD: (Place of goarding) 1. Bow 2. Stern 3. Amidships 
4. Port 5. Sta r board 
DIR_APPROACH: (N , NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW); 1-8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DET_BEF_BOARD: {Presence Detected Before Boarding} 1 . Yes 
TER_BASING· 1. Land 2 . Sea 3. Man-made Fixed Bas e 
MOM_USED: {Mothership Used} 1. Yes 2. No J. Self - Supportillg 
TER_ WARN: (Terrorist warnin e; given before boarding) 1. Yes 
2 No 
TYPE_TER_WARN : 1. Verbal 2 . Elec Comms 3. Shots Fired 
4. Visual or Light 
TYP E __ TFR_CRAFT: 1. Speedboat 2. Gunboat 3. canoe 
4. Harbor Service Craft 5. Rowboat 
G. Trawler/Fi shine Boat 7. Junk/Sampan 
I I T (Meters) 
TER_WPNS_L'SED: (Weapons used ) 1 1 (Code as necessary) 
1. RPGs 2. Swords 3. Torpedo 4. Naval Gunfire 
5 . Knives 6. Machineguns 7. pistol s 
8. Exploding devices 9. Mines 
CASUAl.TIES: 1. Yes 2. 
MAS_INJ: ( Master injured) 1. Yes 2. No 
MAS_DEATH: 1. Yes 2. No 
OFF_INJ: 1. Yes 2. No 
OFF_ DEATH: Yes 2. No 
NUM_OFF _ 1 NJ : 
NUM_OFF _ DEAD: I 
Yes 2. 
CREW_DEATH: 1. Yes 2. No 
NUM_CREW_INJ 
NUM_CREW_DEAD: 
HOSTAGE_ TAKEN: 1. Yes 2. No 
NUM_ HOS_ TAKEN: (Numbe r of Hostages Taken) 
CLASS~INJURY: Code as most serious 
1. No injuries 
2 . Minor injuries 
3. Med'i um injuries (attended to on board ) 
4. Serious injuries (major attention, medevac reqd) 
5. Death 
VERB_REPORT : 1. Before Attack 2. During Attack 
3. Immediately After Attack 4 Delayed 
REPORT_WATERS: 1. Territoria1 2 . International Waters 
REP_ PORT: 1 Yes 2 . No 
REP_SHORE: 1. Yes 2. No 
REP_ SHIPOWNER : 1 Yes 2. No 
REP_ IMO: '1. Yes 2. No 
REP_RCC: (Rescue and Coordination Center) 1 Yes 2. No 
REP_ 1MB: 1 . Yes 2. No 
~P_OT~R: ________________________________________ _ 
INVESTIGATION: 1. Territorial State 2. Internal (S hipowner ) 
3. Other Party (Indicate in Note s) 
INS_ CLAIM: (Insurance Claim Filed) 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown 
" 
MOVEMENT DATA 
PORT_DIRECT; (Port Direction) 1. Inbound 2. Outbound 3. At Sea 
'i. At Anchorage 
COMMENTS/M! SCEii ANEOUS 
SOURCE: 
APPE ND I X B 
REGI ONAL BREAKDOWN 
1 . Sou t h East Asia 
I Phi I ippines (RP) 
2. Vietnam (VM) 
2. Nor th Eas t Asia 
1. Japan 
2 . Okinawa 
3. I ndon esia 
4. Med i t e r ran ean 
I. Algeria (AG) 
2 . Leba n on (LE) 
3. France (FR) 
4. Turkey (TU) 
5. Israel (IS) 
6. Tunisia (TS) 
7 . Spain (SP) * 
8. Italy ( IT) 
9. Albania (Al) 
l O.Greeece (GR) 
11. Libya (LY) 
5 . Wes t Af r i ca 
1. Angola ( AO) 
2 . South Africa (SF) 
3. Morocco ( MO) 
4. Western Sahara (WI) 
6. Eas t Africa 
1. oj ibouti (OJ) 
2. Egypt (EG) 
3. Ethiopia (ET) 
4. Soma l ia (SO) 
7 . Cen tra l America 
1. EI Sa l vador (ES) 
2. Nicaragua (NU) 
3 . Panama ( PM ) 
4. Mexico (M-X) 
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8. Sou t h Ame r ica 
I Bra z i I (BR) 
2. Col ombia (CO) 
3 . Peru (PE) 
4. Suriname ( NS) 
9. India 
1 Bangladesh (BG ) 
2. India (IN) 
3. Pakistan (PK) 
4. Sri La nka (CE) 
10. North A tl a nt ic 
I. Belgium (BE) 
2. Germany (GE) 
3 . Un ited Kingdom (UK) 
4. I r eland (EI) 
5. Sweden (SW) 
6. Portugal (PO) 
7 . Spain (SP) . 
8. Netherlands (Nl) 
9. Iceland (IC) 
10. Norway (NO) 
Middl e Eas t 
1. Gulf of oman 
2. Saudi Arabia SA) 
3. Iran (IR) 
4. Iraq (IZ ) 
5 . Persian Gulf 
6. No rth Yemen (VS) 
7 . South Vemen ( YE) 
8. Qatar (QA) 
12 . USA/Canada 
13. Caribbean 
1. Bahamas ( BF) 
2. Cuba (CU) 
3. Straits of Florida 
4 . Puerto Rico (US) 
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APPENDIX C 
TWO LETTER DIA COUNTRY DESIGNATION 














SA- SAUD I ARABIA 
5P- SPAI:-l 
TU- TURKEY 
UK- UNITED K I NGDOM 
UR- USSR/RUSSIA 
us- UNITED STATES 
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